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CASE COMMENTS
Securities Regulation-THE EXTENSION OF POTENTIAL AIDING AND
ABETTING LIABILITY TO BROKER-DEALERS UNDER RULE 10B-5 OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION-Rolf v. Blyth, EastmanDil-

lon & Co., 570 F. 2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1963, David E. Rolf opened a discretionary investment account
with Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc. (BEDCO), a broker-dealer
in securities.' Prior to that time, Rolf had maintained nondiscretionary accounts at several major brokerage houses and had
made his own decisions with respect to securities transactions.'
Prior to his association with BEDCO, his investment objective was
3
capital gains first and security second.
At BEDCO, Rolf's account was managed by S. Logan Stirling, a
partner in the firm until his retirement in March, 1969. Upon Stirling's retirement, Rolf, an experienced and aggressive investor,4 decided that Stirling's replacement, Michael Stott, was not sufficiently qualified to direct his account.5 At Rolf's request, Stott supplied the names of two independent investment advisors who might
satisfy Rolf's requirement of "an analyst with sufficient expertise to
direct his investments."' Consequently, on May 9, 1969, he hired
Akiyoshi Yamada, a highly regarded independent investment ad7
visor.

Rolf left his account with BEDCO but informed the firm by letter
that Yamada had full authority to initiate transactions in the account and that BEDCO should comply with Yamada's instructions
in every respect.' Transactions were to be traded through BEDCO
if at all possible, and BEDCO was to receive a confirmation when
they were handled through another brokerage house.' Rolf specifi1. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
642 (1978). Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc. is the successor firm of Eastman Union Securities & Co., with whom Rolf originally opened the account.
2. Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
3. Id.
4. 570 F.2d at 41; see 424 F. Supp. at 1025.
5. 424 F. Supp. at 1027.
6. Id.
7. 570 F.2d at 42.
8. 424 F. Supp. at 1028. As compensation, Yamada was to receive 10% of Rolf's capital
gains.
9. Id. at 1028, 1030.
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cally asked Stott to look after the account. 0
From May, 1969, to March, 1970, the value of Rolf's portfolio
declined from $1,423,000 to $446,000 under Yamada's management." In July, 1973, Rolf filed suit against BEDCO, Stott, and
Yamada, alleging that they had defrauded him in violation of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 10(b),' 2 and rule 10b-5 of
the Securities Exchange Commission. 3 Rolf also alleged that the
defendants had violated article M, section 2, of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Rules of Fair Practice" and
rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)."
10. 570 F.2d at 42.
11. Id.
12. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
14. Article I, § 2 provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is
suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such
customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and
needs.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION or SEcuurrEs DALESs, INC. MANuAL 2152 (1973).
15. Rule 405 provides:
Every member organization is required through general partner, a principal executive officer or a person or persons designated under the provisions of Rule 342(b)(1)
to
(1) Use diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every
order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such organization and
every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or carried by such
organization [and to]
(2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by registered representatives of the
organization.
2 NYSE GumE (CCH) 3697 (1978).
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The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York concluded that Yamada had indeed violated rule 10b-5 by
fraudulently manipulating individual stocks in Rolf's account and
by managing the overall account in a fraudulent manner through
the purchase of unsuitable securities. 6 BEDCO and Stott were held
liable by the district court for aiding and abetting Yamada's fraud.
Furthermore, the district court implied a private cause of action
against BEDCO and Stott under the NYSE Rules and the NASD
Constitution.'" The court awarded damages of $55,790, which represented the amount of commissions and interest paid to BEDCO for
transactions in Rolf's account.' 8 BEDCO and Stott appealed the
district court's decision as to liability while Rolf challenged its measure of damages."9
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the aiding and
abetting charge against BEDCO and Stott and remanded the cause
to the district court for recomputation of damages based on Rolf's
gross economic loss." The court also concluded that Stott's assurances to Rolf of his confidence in Yamada's investment decisions,
his reckless disregard for the truth of the assurances, and his reckless disregard of the improper and fraudulent management of Rolf's
account were "substantial causal factors" in the perpetration of
Yamada's fraud.2 ' Having found liability under the aiding and abetting theory, the court did not reach the issue of whether a private
cause of action existed under NYSE or NASD guidelines. That issue
remains unresolved in the Second Circuit.Y
The decision by the Second Circuit in Rolf is without precedent.
In upholding the judgment of liability against Stott and BEDCO,
the court expanded liability under rule 10b-5, broadened the concept of aiding and abetting, further relaxed the scienter standard for
10b-5 violations, and created an intractable situation for the securi16. 424 F. Supp. at 1043.
17. Id. at 1043-44. BEDCO was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the
securities law doctrine of controlling persons liability, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 75t(a) (1970). See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976) (respondeat
superior); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975) (respondeat
superior); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974) (liability while in
scope of employment).
18. 424 F. Supp. at 1045.
19. 570 F.2d at 41.
20. Id. at 48-49.
21. Id. at 44, 48.
22. Id. at 43 n.6. Judge Mansfield in dissent agrees that there should be no implied right
of action under NYSE rule 405 or NASD art. III, § 2, but goes one step further in contending
that these regulations should provide a measure of protection for brokers, as well as investors,
against being victimized by unscrupulous customers. Id. at 56.
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ties industry. The results of Rolf contravene the implied intent of
23
recent United States Supreme Court decisions.

I1. AIDING AND ABETING
Common law tort theory has significantly influenced the formulation and development of the concept of aiding and abetting.2 4 The
Restatement of Torts contains general guidelines which the courts
have used in developing the required elements of this offense. 2 Section 876(b) of the Restatement states that for secondary liability
(aiding and abetting), the accused must know that the other party's
conduct constitutes a breach of duty and must give substantial
assistance or encouragement to the other party's conduct. The circuit courts have built upon this standard, independently determining the elements necessary for an act to constitute aiding and abetting of a securities law violation. Though the required elements are
not universally agreed upon, many similarities in approach do
exist."
In 1969, the Seventh Circuit, in the landmark case of Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.,2 established liability for
aiding and abetting a securities law fraud based on the defendant's
active and knowing assistance in the commission of an independent
securities law violation. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit requires that a
party other than the accused commit a securities law violation, that
the accused have a general awareness of his role in the improper
activity, and that the accused knowingly and substantially assist
in the violation.2 8 The Third Circuit, using a similar test, requires
"an independent wrong" and knowledge by the accused of the
wrong's existence, rather than merely an awareness of a role in an
improper activity.2'
23. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Black & Sachnoff, Aftermath of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, in NEw TRENDS IN Sacu'r iEs LMGATION 179 (1977).
24. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
See 570 F.2d at 45; Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, in Pan Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv.
597, 620 (1972).
25. RESTATEmrr OF ToRTs § 876 (1939).
26. See Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1975).
27. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970) (defendant held liable for giving active and knowing assistance to a third
party engaged in violations of securities laws).
28. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974) (chairman of board of corporation
engaged in borrowing funds was not aider and abettor of 10b-5 fraud when he had no knowledge of misrepresentations to lenders or did not knowingly assist in the deception).
29. Landry v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974).
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In Ernst & Ernst'v. Hochfelder,3" the Supreme Court declined an
opportunity to delineate the necessary elements of aiding and abetting a 10b-5 violation. Instead, the Court further confused the issue
by raising, and then leaving unanswered, the question of whether
aiding and abetting liability was even appropriate under 10b-5. 3
Since Hochfelder, the influential Second Circuit has continued to
find aiding and abetting liability appropriate, 3 as have several other
courts.3 In Rolf, the court required the following elements for liabil-

ity: (1) the commission of a securities law violation by a primary
party, (2) defendant's knowledge of the fraud, (3) scienter on the
part of the defendant, and (4) substantial assistance rendered by
the defendant.3 ' An examination of these elements as applied to the
facts in Rolf reveals that the Second Circuit has made an unwarranted expansion of the principles underlying these elements and,
consequently, has created a precedent which should not stand.
A.

Primary Securities Law Violation

The commission of a securities law violation by a primary party
is a prerequisite to any consideration of a defendant's liability as an
aider and abettor. In Rolf, Yamada clearly violated rule 10b-5 35 by
manipulating securities purchased for Rolf's account so as to increase their value artificially.36 This much was conceded on appeal.
These actions by Yamada, however, were not the fraud which Stott
and BEDCO were found to have aided and abetted. In fact, they did
not know of these manipulations or have any reason to suspect
them .

37

30. In Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Court held that an action for civil damages
could not be maintained under § 10b or rule 10b-5 without an intent to deceive, manipulate
or defraud on the defendant's part since some element of scienter was necessary for liability.
See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949), for the Supreme Court's
definition of aiding and abetting in the criminal area.
31. See text accompanying note 48 infra.
32. Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977). (knowing assistance of or participation in a fraudulent scheme gives rise to liability as an aider-abettor under 10b-5); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977) (knowledge of investor-client relationship,
knowledge of fraud, and action in concert with the investment advisor required for liability
under lOb-5). See also Halcyon Sec., Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. Ssc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,212 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
33. See, e.g., Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1977); Denny v. Carey, 72 F.R.D.
574 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
34. 570 F.2d at 46-48.
35. Id. at 44. It is well established that there exists a private cause of action for a violation
of rule 10b-5. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971)).
36. 424 F. Supp. at 1034.
37. Id. at 1032.
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The district court in Rolf viewed Yamada's 10b-5 violation as
including not only his manipulations, but also his overall management of Rolf's account. Yamada's purchase of speculative stocks
constituted a fraud.s Stott and BEDCO were found liable for aiding
and abetting this fraud based on Stott's repeated assurances to Rolf
of Yamada's competence and his failure to uncover and stop the
mismanagement. 9
In adopting this version of primary liability, the Second Circuit
has unduly broadened rule 10b-5's prohibitions against manipulative and deceptive practices. The investment of a client's funds in
securities which are not suitable for his investment objectives, while
possibly a violation under another theory, should not be a violation
of rule 10b-5.'0 The Supreme Court, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores," as well as in Hochfelder, has given strong indications
that it believes rule 10b-5 should be construed narrowly.'"
In Blue Chip Stamps, the Court pointed out that civil remedies
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are judicially implied causes of
action and, consequently, that their bounds should not be extended
except as demanded by compelling policy considerations.' 3 The
underlying rationale for this policy is the vexatious nature of 10b-5
litigation." The Court provided two examples. First, suits filed
under an expanded version of the rule may be groundless but nonetheless may have settlement value because the allegations cannot
be disproved before trial. This poses a possible disruption in normal
business activities. Second, discarding strict rules of liability would
throw open to the Court many hazy issues of historical fact which
5
depend almost entirely on oral testimony.
The decision in Rolf creates precisely these problems. A difficult,
if not impossible, task presents itself to the court, which must now
determine what an investor's objectives are and then discern what
stocks are suitable for those objectives. To permit this cause of
action under 10b-5 will increase tremendously the volume of litiga38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

570 F.2d at 43.
Id. at 44, 48.
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 3.
421 U.S. 723 (1975).
The Court observed:
While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the elimination of
artificial barriers to recovery on just claims, we are not the first court to express
concern that the inexorable broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in this
area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214-15 n.33 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 747-48).
43. 421 U.S. at 736-37.
44. Id. at 743.
45. Id.
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tion from investors who believe, honestly or otherwise, that they
have been victimized by their investment advisor.
In Hochfelder, the Court implied a narrow reading of 10b-5 by
rejecting negligence as a measure of scienter in 10b-5 cases." Although the rule itself does not preclude negligence, the Court required knowing and intentional misconduct for a violation of the
rule.47 The Court stated that:
In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud is required for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b5, we need not consider whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the Rule, nor the ele•ments necessary to establish such a cause of action."
This puzzling footnote on the appropriateness of aiding and abetting liability, when read in the context of the balance of the opinion
and Blue Chip Stamps, leaves one with the distinct impression that
10b-5 is designed for direct liability situations and is ill adapted to
secondary applications. This is the position taken by the Securities
and Exchange Commission as revealed in a staff memo published
in response to the Hochfelder decision." The Commission recommends that prosecutions under 10b-5 be pursued on a direct or
indirect basis of liability and that the use of the aiding and abetting
doctrine be avoided. The extension of 10b-5 liability, especially
under aiding and abetting theory, is quite inappropriate in Rolf and,
moreover, is in conflict with Hochfelder.
Even if the overall mismanagement theory of primary liability is
not discarded on the basis of an unwarranted extension of the scope
of 10b-5, the facts in Rolf do not support the contention that the
stocks purchased for Rolf were unsuitable. Rolf was a speculator,
not an investor. He had capitalized handsomely in the bull market
of the midsixties and was not opposed to the purchase of speculative
issues. 0 Rolf had stated in a letter to Yamada that, starting with
roughly $2 million, he expected to wind up with $3.5 to $5 million
46. 425 U.S. at 193.
47. Id. at 197.
48. Id. at 191-92 n.7.
49. SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-4 (May 26, 1976).
50. Mansfield in dissent describes Rolf as:
[A] sophisticated investor in securities who was well aware of the difference between gilt-edge, relatively safe securities, on the one hand, and speculative "high
fliers," on the other, and who had determined to get richer quick by choosing an
aggressive program involving high-risk, OTC [over the counter] stocks in the hope
that his adviser would succeed in picking a few big winners, but well aware of the
pitfalls that were involved.
570 F.2d at 53 (footnote omitted).
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within a year's time.5 This is not the objective of a cautious investor.
The district court found that Rolf expected Yamada to take substantial risks for capital gains.52 However, neither the district court
nor the circuit court adequately considered these facts in judging
the suitability of the stocks. Rather, both courts refused to look at
the individual stocks involved and relied on the concept of an "allencompassing web of fraud" to avoid the actual determination of
suitability. 3 In his dissent in Rolf, Judge Walter R. Mansfield correctly suggests that the majority's conclusory treatment of this issue
fails to establish a fraud which supports aiding and abetting liability.54 He also argues that when the case is "stripped of the brooding
omnipresence of Yamada's flagrant manipulations," 5 nothing remains but unfocused allegations that Stott deceived Rolf. He concludes, "[iun short, stripped of its conclusory characterizations, the
majority opinion would barely make out a case of negligence on the
part of Stott, much less one of his deliberately shutting his eyes to
facts that would have revealed the 'fraud' on Yamada's part."5
The circuit court's lax treatment of suitability is also revealed in
its treatment of the damages issue. The court suggested that Rolf
receive his gross economic loss reduced by the percentage decline of
a general stock index over the period. 57 This method of computing
damages ignores the fact that Rolf was an aggressive investor. The
stocks which he would have owned, regardless of the mismanagement, would have been much more volatile than those in a general
market index. Consequently, any price declines on these stocks
probably would have been greater than the declines in the index
during the same period. To reimburse Rolf for these additional
losses would be unjust and would reward his speculations.
B. Knowledge and Scienter
The second and third elements necessary for aiding and abetting
liability in the Second Circuit are knowledge of the fraud and intentional actions by the defendant to further the fraud. Although these
two concepts are distinct and should be considered separately, 8 the
51. Id.
52. 424 F. Supp. at 1028.
53. 570 F.2d at 47.
54. Id. at 50-51 (suggesting that investment in unsuitable stocks is too amorphous a
concept upon which to base liability).
55. Id. at 51.
56. Id. at 52.
57. Id. at 49.
58. Ruder, supra note 24, at 631.
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Second Circuit essentially merged the two and concluded that
Stott's recklessness satisfied both requirements." In fact, Stott was
not reckless in failing to uncover Yamada's fraud and did not act
with the required scienter.
Knowledge of the primary fraud is the most important element
of aiding and abetting liability. Without it, no culpability can be
established. Deviation from this requirement would impose unreasonable liability on secondary defendants.60 The crucial prerequisite
of knowledge has always been stressed in the Second Circuit and is
firmly established in other circuits as well. 6 For example, in Hirsch

v. du Pont,62 the Second Circuit stated that liability under rule 10b5 is the result of knowing assistance or participation in a fraudulent
scheme. Knowledge of the fraud was also deemed an essential ele64
ment in Abrahamson v. Fleschner" and in Lowenschuss v. Kane.
In Rolf, the court relied on Stott's allegedly reckless behavior to
satisfy the knowledge requirement. The court found Stott to be
reckless in not uncovering the primary 10b-5 violation by Yamada,
which was tenuously defined as an "all-encompassing web of
fraud.""5 Stott's conduct was described by the court as highly unreasonable, departing to such a degree from the standard of ordinary
care that the danger itself must have been either known to Stott or
so obvious that Stott was somehow aware of it.16 In labeling Stott's

behavior as reckless under this definition, the Second Circuit has
ignored the realities and complexities of the securities industry.
Under the circumstances, Stott did not digress from the standard
of ordinary care to the point where his conduct could be labeled
reckless. As Judge Mansfield pointed out in dissent, Yamada was a
Harvard-trained specialist who was widely regarded as brilliant and
had devoted his career to the analysis of small, relatively unknown
firms.6 7 Rolf hired him as an investment advisor to take advantage
59. 570 F.2d at 46-47.
60. Ruder, supra note 24, at 638.
61. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F.2d 364, 374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 875 (1974) (the one clear requirement for establishing aiding and abetting liability under
10b-5 is actual knowledge of the fraud); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 739
(10th Cir. 1974) (defendant's knowing assistance in fraudulent scheme gave rise to liability).
See also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D.Ind. 1966), affl'd,
417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
62. 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977).
63. 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
64. 520 F.2d 255, 268 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975) (aider-abettor must assist principal with knowledge of material falsity or be reckless in determining existence of material falsity in registration statement, or knowingly and substantially assist the violation).
65. 570 F.2d at 47.
66. Id. (citing Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977)).
67. 570 F.2d at 54.
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of this expertise, hoping to capitalize quickly on speculative investments. 8 Furthermore, large brokerage houses such as BEDCO devote relatively little time to such special situations. Rather, they
leave this area of the market to analysts such as Yamada. Most of
their research is directed toward stocks which will appeal to the
majority of their customers. Generally, these are stocks of widely
known, heavily capitalized companies. To expect Stott and BEDCO
to investigate the stocks being bought by an independent advisor
such as Yamada, and to, in effect, second guess the advisor, is
unreasonable."' In Lanza v. Drexel & Co.70 the court stated that the
duty to investigate did not extend to such extraordinary efforts.
Yamada independently made investment decisions based on his
discretionary authority. Stott's alleged position of overseer "in the
absence of some fixed, written delineation of authority and responsibility borders on the meaningless."'" As Judge Mansfield states:
[It would have been foolhardy for him to voice such a view to Rolf
[that the stocks were "junk"], since Yamada, who was in command and had gained his reputation in part from his successful
dealing in special situations, might well be possessed of detailed
information not available to or obtained by BEDCO or Stott."
Turning to the scienter requirement, the Hochfelder decision rejected negligence as the equivalent of scienter in 10b-5 cases.73 As
mentioned previously, the Second Circuit had held prior to
Hochfelder, however, that recklessness was sufficient, and presently interprets the Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder as leaving this rule undisturbed.7 5 In Rolf, the court stated that "at least
where, as here, the alleged aider and abettor owes a fiduciary duty
to the defrauded party, recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement. 7 Stott did owe a fiduciary duty to Rolf by way of the account
relationship. 77 However, this duty did not extend to making determinations as to the suitability of stocks purchased by an independent investment advisor.
68. Id. at 53.
69. Id. at 54.
70. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
71. 570 F.2d at 53 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 55.
73. 425 U.S. at 193.
74. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (proof of willful or reckless
disregard for the truth is necessary to establish liability under rule lOb-5) (emphasis added);
see Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363-64 (2d Cir. 1973).
75. 570 F.2d at 46.
76. Id. at 44 (footnote omitted).
77. Id.
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The Second Circuit cites Hanly v. SEC7 8 as an example of fiduciary duty in a broker-client relationship. In Hanly, a securities
salesman misrepresented a known fact while inducing a customer
to purchase stock. The court stated that, in such a situation, the
salesman must disclose facts which he knows and which are reasonably ascertainable.79 Rolf is clearly distinguishable from Hanly.
Stott was not selling or promoting Yamada's services to Rolf, as Rolf
had already independently contracted with Yamada. Stott misrepresented no known facts. His assurances were not baseless, as the
court charged, 0 but were premised on the excellent reputation
which Yamada enjoyed. Stott had no reason to suspect that Yamada's reputation was unwarranted.
The court stated that Stott had agreed to oversee Yamada's investments,' but this was not really Stott's function. Rather, Stott
was responsible merely for handling operational aspects of the account transactions and for obtaining fair prices for stocks traded.82
He had no expertise as an analyst which would have enabled him
to oversee the quality of the purchases,83 and he received no additional compensation for his advice. Stott had no economic interest
at all in Yamada's recommendations. He received only fixed commissions for trading the securities-a service available at any brokerage house.
While the court equates Stott's "reckless" assurances to Rolf and
his "reckless" failure to disclose Yamada's web of fraud with scienter, the facts themselves indicate that Stott's actions were at most
negligent. And the Supreme Court held in Hochfelder that negligence does not constitute scienter in 10b-5 cases.
The court should have noted one of the conclusions stated in
Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas,8 a case which was cited frequently in Rolf. In Metro Bank, the Court decided that the scienter
requirement scales upward when the activity in question is more
remote. 5 In Rolf, the Second Circuit has, in effect, taken a step back
78. 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969).
79. Id. at 597.
80. 570 F.2d at 47-48.
81. Id. at 45 n.10.
82. Id. at 54 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (function performed by Stott and BEDCO custodial).
83. Id. at 43. Stott had referred to the stocks as "junk." However, the court placed
insufficient weight on the fact that Stott did not know of Roll's objectives or have analytical
abilities upon which to base the remark.
84. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
85. Id. at 95 (bank was not liable for aiding and abetting borrower's fraud because bank
was not aware of its role in the improper activity and did not knowingly render substantial
assistance).
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toward negligence in order to impute the intent necessary to impose
aiding and abetting liability for securities fraud.
C.

The Impact of the Decision

While securities laws should not be construed so narrowly that the
results they were designed to attain cannot be achieved,"' they
should not be an "amorphous snare" for the guilty and innocent
alike.87 The court in Rolf has created such a snare.
By defining investments in unsuitable stocks as a violation of 10b5 and by relaxing the scienter requirements, especially in the context of secondary liability, the court has unnecessarily expanded
potential liability under 10b-5. As Judge Mansfield stated:
[T]o hold that investment of a customer's account in unsuitable
securities constitutes § 10(b) fraud and that a broker who executes
orders given by an investment advisor pursuant to his discretionary authority may be held liable as an aider and abettor of such
fraud, places an extraordinary and unconscionable burden on both
the adviser and the broker."
If the court felt compelled to find Stott and BEDCO liable, liability
should have been based on violations of the NASD Rules of Fair
Practice or rule 405 of the NYSE rather than on a strained interpretation of 10b-5. The dissent correctly made this distinction; the
majority, unfortunately, did not.
By recognizing investment suitability as a basis of 10b-5 liability,
the Second Circuit has placed itself in a position which is at best
tenuous. It is difficult to establish just what an investor's objectives
are and what risk-reward ratio he is willing to assume. It is nearly
impossible to try to determine what stocks are suitable in meeting
these objectives. These are subjective matters over which even experienced brokers and investment counselors disagree. It is only proper
to ask how qualified federal judges are to make investment distinctions which even investment professionals hesitate to make.
Essentially, the Second Circuit has created a cause of action for
account mismanagement. This decision will spawn precisely the
type of litigation denounced so forcefully in Blue Chip Stamps. 81 In
addition, as Judge Friendly stated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
86. Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 739 (10th Cir. 1974) (corporation and
its president held liable for perpetrating a fraud on plaintiff by inducing plaintiff to purchase
the corporation's stock).
87. 522 F.2d at 97.
88. 570 F.2d at 55-56 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
89. 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (vexatious suits).
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Co., 0 an unduly expansive imposition of civil liability "will lead to
large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors,
for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers .... "
In failing to grasp the basic relationships between the parties in
Rolf, the court based its finding of liability on facts which, in the
words of Judge Mansfield, "barely make out a case of negligence
... ," The securities industry will feel the most immediate impact of this decision. Independent investment advisors are major
participants in the securities markets. They advise and manage
innumerable accounts, ranging from individual trusts to multimillion dollar pension and profit-sharing funds. Since advisors are
generally not broker-dealers, the transactions they generate must be
traded through firms with that capacity. The accounts at the
broker-dealer are normally listed in the customer's name, with the
advisor retaining control over the account, just as in Rolf's situation.
In most instances, the broker-dealer such as Stott has no intimate
familiarity with the investment objectives of the customer. To place
the burden of determining investment suitability on the brokerdealer is unwieldy, unwise, and unfair.
The Second Circuit, in establishing potential aider and abettor
liability for broker-dealers in this situation, has created an atmosphere in which accounts, handled by advisors specializing in little
known or fledgling companies, will be shunned. This will have the
effect of reducing the flow of capital to developing sectors of the
economy and may tend to accumulate capital in heavily traded
stocks which are unquestionably suitable for most investors. In
short, it will inhibit diversified economic growth and encourage increased economic rigidity.
Although the court denied a petition for rehearing in Rolf,"2 it did
try to reduce the impact of its decision by amending the opinion in
an order dated May 22, 1978.3 Footnote 16A was added, which
90. 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
91. 570 F.2d at 52 (Mansfield, J,, dissenting).
92. No. 77-7104 (2d Cir., order July 3, 1978).
93. No. 77-7104, 77-7124 (2d Cir., order May 22, 1978). The full text of that order, not
presented in the Federal Reporter 2d, is as follows:
ORDER AMENDING OPINION
The opinion in the above entitled case is hereby amended by inserting Footnote
16A at the end of the first paragraph on slip opinion 905, after the word "fraud,"
said footnote reading as follows:
16A. This decision does not impose liability on a broker-dealer who merely
executes orders for "unsuitable" securities made by an investment advisor
vested with sole discretionary authority to control the account. In the present
case, the broker-dealer, although charged with supervisory authority over the
advisor and aware that the advisor was purchasing "junk," actively lulled
the investor by expressing confidence in the advisor without bothering to
investigate whether these assurances were well-founded.
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states that the decision does not impose liability on a broker-dealer
who merely executes orders for "unsuitable" securities made by an
investment advisor vested with sole discretionary authority. The
court distinguishes this situation from that in Rolf by noting that
Stott and BEDCO, as a supervisory authority, made unfounded
assurances, and knew that some of the stocks purchased were unsuitable. For the reasons delineated earlier, these distinctions are a
weak foundation on which to base such severe results. The arrangement between Rolf and Yamada certainly appeared to be one involving sole discretionary authority. There were no written instructions otherwise. Furthermore, Stott's assurances were not unfounded. They were based on his understandable reliance on Yamada's reputation. Moreover, the stock purchases by Yamada were
not unreasonable or unsuitable in view of Rolf's ambitious objectives and Yamada's area of expertise. The tardy footnote, therefore,
offers very little help in determining where the line is drawn as to
broker-dealer liability as an aider and abettor under 10b-5. It certainly does little to soften the impact of the Rolf decision.
MICHAEL
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